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MASSACHUSETIS LAW-SURFACE WATERS-EFFECT OF REA
SONABLE USE STANDARD ON SURFACE WATER CONTROVERSIES-
Tucker v. Badoian, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1294, 370
N.E.2d 717, affd, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207,384 N.E.2d 1195.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1969, Mr. and Mrs. Raymond J. Tucker bought
a house and parcel of land designated "lot 23" in Marshfield,
Massachusetts, from Ronald Tocco. 1 Between the time the Tuckers
first saw lot 23 and the time they purchased it, Morningside Realty
Trust, the Tuckers' northern neighbor, filled and levelled part of
Morningside's land in preparation for a proposed road. The filling
caused subsurface water to back up onto lot 23. Within a week of
the Tuckers' taking possession of lot 23, water began pouring into
their cellar. The house and cellar smelled of raw sewage, and as
much as three feet of water collected in the backyard. 2 The Tuck
ers sued3 both Morningside Realty Trust and Badoian, trustee of
1. Until the spring of 1969, lot 23 was an unimproved, muddy, marsh-like tract
of land. During the spring and summer of 1969, Ronald Tocco, the owner, built a
house on lot 23. He first filled in a drainage ditch that crossed the lot and then dug
holes for the septic tank and cellar. The cellar is in the path of the former ditch. Dur
ing construction these holes partially filled with water. Tucker v. Badoian, 1978
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3210, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1197.
Lot 23 is bordered to the north by a lot belonging to Morningside Realty Trust,
to the south by land uninvolved in this discussion, to the west by an old cranberry
bog, and to the east by Winslow Cemetery Road. To the east of Winslow Cemetery
Road are two ponds which drain through a man-made ditch and then through a cul
vert under the road. Until Ronald Tocco filled in the ditch in the spring of 1969, the
water then flowed into a ditch that crossed lot 23 and drained into a small pothole
which lies partially on lot 23 and partially on Morningside's abutting land. Lot 23
was both the locus of a system formerly used to flood the old cranberry bog and the
low point of Winslow Cemetery Road. Id. at 3209-10, 384 N.E.2d at 1197.
2. To alleviate these problems, Tocco installed a drainage system and filled in
parts of the backyard. Polluted water, however, continued to collect in the cellar.
Tucker v. Badoian, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3211, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1198. Although
the evidence did not clearly establish the water's source, due to the slope of the land
and the placement of the pothole, the court inferred that the water in the backyard
was overflow from the pothole. Id. at 3211 n.5, 384 N.E.2d at 1198 n.5.
3. The plaintiffs brought three other actions relating to the same property
against other defendants. All three were decided in plaintiffs' favor at trial and were
upheld on appeal. Two of the actions, Tucker v. Tocco and Tucker v. Patriot Homes,
Inc., were disposed of on October 31, 1977 by a summary affirmance of judgment for
the plaintiffs. See Tucker v. Patriot Homes, Inc., 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1127.
The third action, against Tocco as trustee of Ronald Realty Trust, was disposed of by
the same rescript in which the appeals court reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs
against Morningside Realty Trust and Badoian. See Tucker v. Badoian, 1977 Mass.
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1294,1295,370 N.E.2d 717, 718.
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Morningside, for negligence and sought recovery for the damages
to their house and land. 4
At trial, the Plymouth County Superior Court held for the
Tuckers, and the appeals court reversed. 5 The Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court granted review and held in Tucker v.
Badoian 6 that the trial judge erred in denying the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment for the de
fendants. Since neither of the parties asked that the existing law
be changed, the court applied the long-standing common enemy
rule to the case. 7 Stated generally, the "common enemy" rule, as
applied to surface water disputes, allows a property owner to im
prove his land and thereby cause water to flow onto his neighbor's
land without incurring liability for his neighbor's damages. 8 Thus,
Morningside and Badoian were not liable for the damages caused
to their neighbors by their land improvements. Although the court
recognized that the defendants might have contributed to the
plaintiffs' damages, under the common enemy rule as followed in
Massachusetts, there would be no liability without proof that the
defendants "caused surface water, which might otherwise have
been absorbed or have flowed elsewhere, to be artificially
channelled and discharged on the plaintiff's land in a place and
quanitity sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief."9 As the defen
dants did not use an artificial channel in causing water to flow onto
the plaintiffs' land, the defendants were not liable for the resulting
damage.
A concurring opinion by Justice Benjamin Kaplan, with five
justices joining, stated that future quarrels 10 between landowners
4. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants negligently made physical
changes to the defendants' land to the detriment of the plaintiffs. See Tucker v.
Badoian, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3207, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1196.
5. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $60,000. The defendants moved for a di
rected verdict and later for a new trial. After a hearing, the judge denied the directed
verdict and reduced the award to $25,000. The appeals court reversed, holding that
the trial judge had erred in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
Tucker v. Badoian, id. at 3207-08, 384 N.E.2d at 1196-97.
6. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3208-09, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1196.
7. Id. at 3215, 384 N.E.2d at 1199.
8. See Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 109 (1865) (adopting the
common enemy rule for resolution of surface water disputes). See also notes 19-22
infra and accompanying text (discussion of the common enemy rule).
9. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3214, 384 N.E.2d at 1199. See notes 44-54 infra and
accompanying text (discussion of Massachusetts' modifications and exceptions to the
common enemy rule and the artificial channel exception).
10. The reasonable use standard is to be applied to conduct occurring after the
decision in Tucker, "excepting future conduct so related in a continuum with past
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concerning surface waters will be resolved by the reasonable use
standard instead of by the common enemy rule.ll Although Jus
tice Kaplan did not define "reasonable use" or set up guidelines for
determining what constitutes a reasonable use of land, he did sug
gest consulting several out-of-state cases 12 and the Restatement of
TortS 13 in deciding future disputes concerning surface water diver
sion. By not defining "reasonable use," the Massachusetts court
leaves property owners in the unenviable situation of not knowing
whether contemplated land improvements will result in liability for
subsequent surface water diversion until the improvement is afait
accompli.
This note discusses the evolution of the Massachusetts rules
governing surface water diversion, the suitability of the reasonable
use standard for use in Massachusetts and the need for a clear
standard to use in determining reasonableness in the context of
surface water diversion.

II.

BACKGROUND

During the booming urban development of the second half of
the nineteenth century, surface water controversies increased rap
idly.14 Because land excavation and road building central to this
development affected surface water 15 drainage, surface water con
troversies arose. States resolved these controversies in three ways.
Most states adopted either the common enemy rule 16 or the civil
conduct that it would be unjust to apply the new standard to it." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh.
at 3220, 384 N.E.2d at 1202.
11. Justices Hennessey, Braucher, Wilkins, Liacos and Abrams joined concur
ring. Thus, six of the seven justices hearing the case supported the adoption of the
reasonable use rule. Id. at 3218,384 N.E.2d at 1201.
12. See note 85 infra.
13. See note 86 infra.
14. The nineteenth century was the first time the urban population was
increasing faster than the rural population. Bridges, The Application of Sur/ace
Water Rules in Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L. REV. 76, 77 (1977).
15. Surface water is generally defined as runoff from rain or melting snow or
ice. MASS. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, COMPILATION AND SUMMARIZATION OF
THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS, SPECIAL LAWS, PERTINENT COURT DECI
SIONS, ETC. RELATING TO WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 31 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
COMPILATION & SUMMARIZATION].
When a landowner improves his property by building structures or paving
ground, he often renders impervious the previously bare ground. The result may be
that surface water, which before the improvement spread fanwise across adjacent
property, now flows in a concentrated manner and in an increased volume thereby
causing damage to the adjacent property. See note 14 supra at 76.
16. See notes 19-22 infra and accompanying text (discussion of the common en
emy approach).
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law rule,17 while one state, New Hampshire, adopted the reason
able use rule. 18
The common enemy approach to the resolution of surface
water controversies is based on property law concepts. The term
"common enemy" was first used in the 1875 New Jersey decision
of Town of Union v. Durkes 19 which stated "surface water was the
common enemy, which every proprietor may fight and get rid of as
best he may. "20 The common enemy rule allows a landowner to
deal with surface waters as he pleases without incurring liability for
harm he may cause to others.21 Those states adopting the common
enemy rule believed it would foster land development since the
developer need not bear the costs to others of his improvements. 22
At a time when urban development was greatly desired, courts
were reluctant to set precedents contrary to this social goal.
The "civil law" rule,23 a rule also based on property law, holds
17. See notes 23-26 infra and accompanying text (discussion of the civil law
rule).
18. New Hampshire first applied the reasonable use rule to the flow of subter
ranean waters. See Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862). The application
of the reasonable use rule was extended to interference with the flow of surface
waters in Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 446 (1870). See notes 34-37 & 61-70 infra and
accompanying text (discussion of the reasonable use rule).
19. 38 N.J.L. 21 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1875).
20. Id. at 22.
21. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 109 (1865); see note 14 supra
at 84; Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891
(1940).
22. For a discussion of why courts adopted the common enemy rule see Kinyon
& McClure, supra note 21, at 898-99. Kinyon and McClure state three reasons courts
adopted the common enemy rule for the resolution of surface water disputes: (1) The
traditional concept of land ownership is that landowners should be able to do as they
please with their land; (2) some courts believed that the common enemy rule repre
sented the common law rule although this fact is in dispute; (3) the common enemy
rule is consistent with the social policy of furthering land development. [d. Bridges
states that the social policy of furthering land development is the only reason for
adopting the common enemy rule that has substantial importance today. See note 14
supra at 85.
See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) for a criticism of the nine
teenth century limitation of liability for the fostering of land development:
It seems apparent to the twentieth century mind, as perhaps it did not
to the nineteenth century mind, that a system in which everybody is invited
to do his own thing, at whatever cost to his neighbor, must work ultimately
to the benefit of the rich and powerful, who are in a position to look after
themselves and to act, so to say, as their own self-insurers. As we look back
on the nineteenth century theories, we are struck most of all, I think, by the
narrow scope of social duty which they implicitly assumed. No man is his
brother's keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take the hindmost.
[d. at 95.
23. The civil law rule was first adopted in Orleans Navigation Co. v. Mayor of
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an improving landowner who interferes with the natural flow of
surface waters liable for resulting injuries to other landowners. This
approach recognizes a servitude of natural drainage. Lower owners
must accept surface water draining onto their land while upper
owners may not alter natural systems of drainage to the lower own
ers' detriment. Thus, under the civil law approach, each landowner
must leave the natural drainage system undisturbed or risk liability
for any injury to his adjoining landowners.24 States adopting this
civil law rule believed that holding liable a person changing the
natural flow of waters was fair. 25 These states also believed the rule
would not inhibit urban growth or development. 26
Problems arose in applying either the common enemy or civil
law rules to the wide variety of conflicts which occurred within a
given jurisdiction. 27 A strict application of the civil law rule did, in
practice, tend to hinder land improvement since the improver had
to bear the costs to others of his improvements. On the other
hand, while the common enemy rule fostered free land improve-

New Orleans, 2 Mart. 214 (La. 1812). The court held that an owner of lower ground
is bound to receive water running from that of a superior landowner; but the water
must be received as it flows by the course of nature, and it cannot be altered or
modified, except by agreement between the parties interested. Id. at 232-33. Bridges
states that at one time the civil law rule was followed by at least 27 states. See note
14 supra at 79.
24. See note 14 supra at 78.
25. The reasoning for adoption of the civil law rule was clearly stated in
Gormley v. Sanford, 52 III. 158 (1869), as follows:
As water must flow, and some rule in regard to it must be established ...
there can clearly be no other rule at once so equitable and so easy of appli
cation as that which enforces natural laws. There is no surprise or hardship
in this, for each successive owner takes with whatever advantages or incon
veniences nature has stamped upon his land.
Id. at 162.
26. Bridges states that there are highly urbanized states that follow the civil
law rule without their growth rate being discouraged. See note 14 supra at 83. See
also Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 691 (1968),
which states that cases claiming that the civil law rule discourages land improvement
assume that land developers' decisions are influenced by rules regarding surface
waters, and that the cases do not mention data to support this assumption.
27. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966),
where the Supreme Court of California held that, since the civil law rule may be too
rigid and occasionally unjust in heavily developed areas, the rule must be modified
by a test of reasonableness. In Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d
136 (1953) and Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971), courts refused
to strictly apply the civil law rules to urban areas.
See note 14 supra at 86-91 (problems of applying a strict common enemy rule
and the resulting modifications to the rule). See also notes 44-54 & 79 infra and ac
companying text.
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ment, it also established a belief in landowners that might made
right. 28 For example, if a person filled his land, thereby causing
surface waters to flow onto his neighbor's land, the neighbor could
build an embankment and force the water to flow back onto the
improver's land, thus rendering the improvement useless. To cope
with the problems encountered in applying these rules to widely
varying situations, exceptions and modifications to the rules
arose. 29 Some states applied one rule to urban areas and another to
rural areas,30 or incorporated the tort principles of "reasonable
ness" and "negligence" into their rules. 31
As the overwhelming importance ascribed to land develop
ment during the industrial revolution diminished, the courts re
flected this change in social policy by further modifying the com
mon enemy and civil law rules. Eventually, too many such
modifications caused the rules to lose their effectiveness and cre
ated a great deal of confusion. 32 To determine whether an im
provement would result in liability for subsequent surface water di
version, one would first have to determine what the general rule
was and then thread through numerous exceptions and modifica
tions made to the general rule. To alleviate this confusion, several
states adopted a reasonable use rule for resolving surface water
controversies. 33
28. Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty? 8 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 73, 78 (1968).
29. See note 27 supra. See also notes 44-54 & 79 infra and accompanying text
(modifications made to the common enemy rule by the Massachusetts courts).

30. Id.
31. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966);
Bates v. Westboro, 151 Mass. 174, 23 N.E. 1070 (1890); Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio
App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953). See also notes 50-52 infra and accompanying text
(Massachusetts' insertion of negligence into the common enemy rule).
32. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 21, at 931-35 (discussion of the numerous
and confusing qualifications of the civil law and common enemy rules).
33. Before 1956 only two states had adopted the reasonable use rule for the res
olution of surface water disputes. See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32
N.W.2d 286 (1948), where Minnesota adopted the reasonable use rule and Swett v.
Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870), where New Hampshire adopted the reasonable use rule
for the resolution of surface water disputes.
States that have recently adopted the reasonable use rule include: Weinberg v.
Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963); Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Tucker v. Badoian, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 384
N.E.2d 1195 (for future controversies); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120
A.2d 4 (1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Jones v.
Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.1. 264, 341 A.2d 735
(1975); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971) (for urban land); City
of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968) (for urban land); Sanford v.
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The reasonable use rule, emanating not from property but
from tort principles, gives a landowner the right to make reason
able alterations to the flow of surface waters without incurring lia
bility for the harm resulting to others.34 Factors relevant in
determining liability vary according to jurisdiction, but they gener
ally include the necessity for the drainage, the care taken to avoid
injury to the land receiving the water, the benefit to the improved
land compared to the resulting harm to the damaged land, and the
reasonableness and feasibility of the drainage system adopted. 35
The reasonable use rule is noted for its flexibility.36 While the
common enemy and civil law rules require many modifications and
exceptions to avoid harsh results in their application to urban and
rural areas,37 the reasonable use rule can be applied to both areas
without the need for these numerous and confusing modifications.

III.

DEVELOPMENT OF SURFACE WATER

LAw

IN MASSACHUSETTS

The earliest approach followed by Massachusetts in resolving
surface water disputes was a strict common enemy rule first
adopted in Luther v. Winnisimmet CO.38 In Luther, the court held
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d
1,224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
Several other states have modified the common enemy or civil law rules to a
point approaching actual adoption of the reasonable use rule. See Keys v. Romley, 64
Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966); Templeton v. Huss, 57 III. 2d
134, 31l N.E.2d 141 (1974); K1utey v. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways, 428
S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967); Baer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 255 Md. 163, 257 A.2d 201
(1969); Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953) (for urban
land); Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash. 2d 491, 519 P.2d 7 (1974).
34. See, e.g., Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870). In Swett, where the reason
able use rule was first adopted in New Hampshire, the court stated that in
determining reasonableness one should consider all the circumstances of the case,
among them the nature and importance of the improvement, the extent of the inter
ference, the amount of injury to the other landowners as compared with the value of
the improvement, and whether or not the injury could have reasonably been
foreseen. ld. at 446.
35. See note 34 supra & note 85 infra and accompanying text (factors used in
determining reasonableness of surface water diversion in several states).
36. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 330, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956);
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201,216,236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (1977); Butler v. Bruno,
115 R.I. 264, 274, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (1975); see note 14 supra at 96-97.
37. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
38. 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 171 (1851). The term "common enemy" is not used in
the opinion, however, the elements of the rule are stated. Water from the plaintiff's
land drained into a pond on the defendant's land. The defendant filled in the pond,
thereby obstructing the flow of water from the plaintiff's land, and the plaintiff sued
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that one landowner is free to stop surface water from entering his
land despite harm to his neighbor. The Massachusetts court reaf
firmed this approach in Gannon v. Hargadon 39 holding:
[In the Massachusetts application of the common enemy rule, it
is not material] whether a party obstructs or changes the direc
tion and flow of surface water by preventing it from coming
within the limits of his land, or by erecting barriers or changing
the level of the soil, so as to tum it off in a new course after it
has come within its boundaries. 40

The court stressed that a landowner has a right to the free and un
fettered control of his land which cannot be interfered with by any
considerations of injury caused to others by interference with the
flow of surface waters. 41 At that time, in order to promote land de
velopment, the Massachusetts court applied the common enemy
rule in a pure form. 42
To prevent the unjust results which arose from the strictness
and rigidity of the common enemy rule in its pure form, the
Massachusetts court43 began making exceptions and modifications
to this rule. 44 One such modification was the artificial channel exfor the resulting damages. The court held that the plaintiff would have a right of
drainage from his land to the defendant's land if the water flowed through a water
course, but the plaintiff would not have a right of drainage if the water was merely
surface water. Id. at 174.
"Watercourse" is defined as a stream, usually flowing in a definite channel, hav
ing a bed and sides or banks. The size is not important, and the flow need not be
constant, but it must be more than a mere surface drainage over an entire face of a
tract of land. Id. at 174.
39. 92 Mass. (10 Alle'n) 106 (1865). Melting snow and rain flowed through a
ditch to the north of the defendant's land and then flowed over a way and through
ruts upon the defendant's land. The defendant placed turf in the ruts and upon his
own land to protect the way from injury, thereby causing water to flow onto the
plaintiff's land.
40. Id. at 109-10.
41. Id. The court stated that the free and unfettered control extended to "law
ful appropriation of land by its owner to a particular use or mode of enjoyment." Id.
(emphasis added).
42. See note 22 supra and accompanying text (discussion of limiting liability as
a means of promoting the social policy of furthering land development in the nine
teenth century).
43. Massachusetts laws governing the use of surface waters have been primar
ily developed judicially and not legislatively. "There is no reference in the General
Laws to any authority to regulate water use beyond the references to pollution,
drinking and swimming water standards and the right to use certain public water
for fishing, fowling, etc." MASS. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, A SUMMARY OF
MASSACHUSETTS STATE LAWS, POLICIES & PROGRAMS PERTAINING TO WATER &
RELATED LAND RESOURCES 68 (1971).
44. See Butler v. Bruno, U5 RI. 264, 269-70, 341 A.2d 735, 739 (1975)
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ception first expressed in 1866 in Franklin v. Fisk. 45 In Frank
lin, the court held that a landowner may not collect surface water
into an artificial channel and then discharge it upon his neighbor's
land. 46 A few years later, in Jackman v. Arlington Mills,47 the
Massachusetts court modified this artificial channel exception by
holding that a landowner may use an artificial channel to discharge
surface water into a watercourse48 if the watercourse is "the natural
outlet of the waters thus collected, even though, by this artificial
arrangement, the flow of waters is accelerated, and the volume at
times is increased . . . . "49 In Bates v. Inhabitants of West
borough,50 this exception was further modified by expanding the
improving landowner's liability to include resulting damages when
surface water in an artificial channel is deflected upon another's
land by either the improver's setting an obstacle in its direct
course or by negligently allowing an obstacle to remain. 51 Thus,
amidst the numerous modifications of the common enemy rule, the
(discussion of the rigid fonnulations of property law on which both the civil law and
the common enemy rules are based); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 14-16, 224 N.W.2d
407, 414-15 (1974) (discussion of the need to modify the common enemy rule in or
der to implement changing social needs). Bridges states that certain modifications,
such as the due care modifications, merely mitigate the harshness of the common
enemy rule. See note 14 supra at 88. See also note 52 infra (an example of Massa
chusetts' insertion of the due care modification, referred to as the tort element of
negligence, into one of its exceptions to the common enemy rule).
45. 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 211 (1866). The plaintiffs built a culvert across a high
way which caused surface water to flow onto the defendant's land. The defendant
blocked the culvert thereby preventing the flow of much of the water from entering
the defendant's land and causing it to flow over and injure the highway.
46. Id. at 211.
47. 137 Mass. 277 (1884). The defendant built tenement houses and cesspools
on his land. The sink water from the houses and the cesspools emptied into a ditch
on the defendant's land which connected with a brook about 500 feet from the
plaintiff's land. Surface water from the defendant's land also flowed through the
ditch and then into the brook. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's acts in
creased the water in the brook causing it to overflow into the plaintiff's cellar re
sulting in the house being unfit for habitation.
48. See note 38 supra (definition of "watercourse").
49. 137 Mass. at 283. This modification of the artificial channel exception is fur
ther qualified by the requirement that the landowner's action be "done in the rea
sonable use of his ... land, and that the discharge is not beyond the natural capacity
of the watercourse, and the land of a riparian owner is not thereby overflowed, and
materially injured." [d.
SO. 151 Mass. 174,23 N.E. 1070 (1890). Bates involved a town's new drainage
system. The new system discharged more water more rapidly through a culvert than
the old system. The culvert filled up, and the drain failed at times to discharge water
freely. The drain on the plaintiff's side of the culvert filled up and overflowed onto
the plaintiff's land.
51. Id. at 181, 23 N.E. at 1071.
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Massachusetts court inserted the tort element of negligence. 52 As
recently as 1957, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court once
again qualified this exception by holding that an artificial channel
may, if in existence for a long time, be treated as a watercourse. 53
Under Massachusetts law watercourses are treated separately from
surface water. 54 Since its adoption of the common enemy rule,
Massachusetts has continued to modify this rule in an effort to
achieve more equitable results. As the artificial channel exception
illustrates, however, the common enemy rule is not well suited to
meet this task. The inflexibility of the common enemy rule necessi
tates numerous modifications which render the rule ineffective and
confusing.
In Tucker v. Badoian,55 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court wisely decided to abandon its modified common enemy rule
and to adopt the reasonable use rule for subsequent controver
sies. 56 With its adoption of the common enemy rule in the nine
teenth century, the Massachusetts court had implemented the then
existing social policy of fostering land development. 57 By rejecting
52. Assessing the elements of negligence or lack of reasonable care was merely
a modification of the common enemy rule in Massachusetts before the decision in
Tucker. Absent negligence or lack of reasonable care the common enemy rule was
applied. See notes 50-51 infra and accompanying text. See also note 14 supra at 88
("due care" modification). Bridges criticizes this modification as it only serves to mit
igate the harshness of the common enemy rule when the improving landowner is
negligent. Id.
53. Kuklinska v. Maplewood Homes, 336 Mass. 489, 146 N.E.2d 523 (1957). An
artificial channel on the defendant's land drained surface water into a swamp that
was partially on the plaintiff's land. This artificial channel had "been in existence
within the memory of man." ld. at 490, 146 N.E.2d at 524. There was testimony that
the channel had been in existence.for 150 years. ld. at 493, 146 N.E.2d at 526. The
court held that, although the plaintiff may have objected to the maintenance of the
channel at an earlier time, due to its long existence, it is to be treated as a water
course, and there remains a right to have the same flow continue. Id. at 494, 146
N.E.2d at 526.
54. For a brief summary of Massachusetts laws pertaining to watercourses see
COMPILATION & SUMMARIZATION, supra note 15, at 17-24,269.
Although the artificial channel exception imposes liability on a landowner who
collects surface water into an artificial channel and then discharges the water upon
his neighbor's land, the exception does not impose liability when the water is dis
charged into a watercourse to which the water would naturally have flowed, even
though the flow of the water is accelerated and the volume is increased. See notes
45-53 supra and accompanying text.
55. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3207,384 N.E.2d at 1195.
56. ld. at 3218-20, 384 N.E.2d at 1201-02. See notes 1-13 supra and accompa
nying text.
57. See note 22 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the nineteenth cen
tury social policy of furthering land development).
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the common enemy rule and adopting the reasonable use rule in
1978, the Massachusetts court has taken a great step toward imple
menting the current social policy of just allocation of development
costs. 58 That a person should have "free and unfettered control of
his property,"59 a basic tenet of the common enemy rule, is no
longer in harmony with current social policy.6o Although there is
still a concern with land development for the greater good of soci
ety, justice is better served by the reasonable use rule which pre
vents the profit making developer from taking actions which are
unreasonable in light of all circumstances surrounding his action
and also which makes him liable for the resulting costs to others of
his improvements when he fails to take such reasonable actions. 61
This awareness of changing social policy has been the basis for
justifications for the abandonment of both the civil law and com
mon enemy rules in several states. As stated in State v. Deetz,62 in
which Wisconsin adopted the reasonable use rule in favor of the
common enemy rule:
[The common enemy rule] is not a timeless rule of property.
Rather, it is one that apparently served the temporary purposes
of society well in tlIe days of burgeoning national expansion of
the mid-nineteenth and early-twentietlI centuries. The concept
tlIat a [sic] owner of real property can, in all cases, do as he
pleases with his property is no longer in harmony with the reali
ties of our society. 63

When New Jersey abandoned the common enemy rule and
adopted the reasonable use rule in Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 64
the court reasoned that, although building projects are in the social
good, there is no reason for the adjoining landowners, rather than
the profit making builders themselves, to bear the economic costs
incident to the builders' expulsion of surface waters. "Social prog
58. See notes 62-70 infra and accompanying text (discussion of policy reasons
for favoring the adoption of the reasonable use rule).
59. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) at 109.
60. See State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 224 N.W.2d 407, 414 (1974), where
in discussing the rejection of the common enemy rule the court states that "[w]hen a
rule of law thwarts social policy rather than promotes it, it is the obligation of a com
mon law court to undo or modifY a rule that it has previously made."
61. See notes 34 supra & note 85 infra (tests used in determining reasonable
ness in the context of surface water diversion). See also notes 88-96 infra (suggested
test for determining reasonableness in the context of surface water diversion).
62. 66 Wis. 2d 1,224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
63. ld. at 14-15,224 N.W.2d at 414.
64. 20 N.J. 320, 329, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956).
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ress and the common wellbeing are in actuality better served by a
just and right balancing of the competing interests according to the
general principles of fairness and common sense which attend the
application of the rule of reason. "65 In Butler v. Bruno,66 the
Rhode Island Supreme Court noted the reasonable use rule's flexi
bility in its applicability to "situations unthought of in the day
when surface water was truly considered to be the common en
emy."67 The court decided that the rule would "permit a more eq
uitable allocation of the costs of. . . improvements, for the owner
improving his land must take into consideration the true cost of
such development to the community."68 When North Carolina
abandoned the civil law rule and adopted the reasonable use rule
in Pendergrast v. Aiken,69 the court noted that the numerous mod
ifications made to the old rule, necessary to permit the reasonable
use of land,
ha[ve] resulted in uncertainty of the law and reduced predic
tibility. . . . [The reasonable use rule] can be applied effectively,
fairly and consistently in any factual setting ... and thus has the
capacity to accommodate changing social needs . . . . [and] is
more in line with the realities of modern life and that consist
ency, fairness and justice are better served through the flexibil
ity afforded by that rule. 70

The flexibility of the reasonable use rule makes it especially
appropriate for application in a state as diverse as Massachusetts.
Massachusetts has great variations in geography, climate, and pop
ulation distribution and has varying water problems in different
areas. 71 Although rainfalF2 is rather evenly distributed throughout
the year, it rains more frequently in the upland areas. 73 Snowfall,
Id. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10.
115 R.1. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975).
Id. at 274, 341 A.2d at 741.
68. Id.
69. 293 N.C. 201, 216, 236 S.E.2d 787,796 (1977).
70. Id. at 215-16, 236 S.E.2d at 795-96.
71. The land surface of Massachusetts is mountainous along the western border
and generally hilly elsewhere. But certain coastal areas consist of flat land with
marshes and small ponds and lakes. The climate of the state has wide daily and an
nual variations in temperature and precipitation. There are large differences between
the same seasons in different years with great diversity between areas. WATER RE
SOURCES RESEARCH CENTER, YIELD OF STREAMS IN MASSACHUSETTS 3-5 (1967).
72. Thirty-four to seventy percent of the rainfall becomes surface water. Id.
at 5.
73. Id. at 4. Since frequency of precipitation varies from area to area in
Massachusetts and since such a large percentage of the precipitation becomes sur
65.
66.
67.
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which accounts for much surface water in the spring, increases rap
idly from the coast westward. 74 Although Massachusetts does not
have an overall water shortage, serious local shortages are pres
ent. 75 It also has problems with the distribution of the available
water supply and with the loss of potential water supplies due to
increasing urbanization, especially around Boston. 76 Since surface
water accounts for a great percentage of the fresh water used 77 arid
since all waters are interrelated in the hydrologic cycle,78 surface
water laws will certainly have a far-reaching effect in Massa
chusetts. 79 Due to the varying water problems in different parts of

face water, Massachusetts' present water resource problem is one of distribution and
management.ld. at 5.
74. ld. at 4. Variations in seasonal accumulations of snow have ranged from
over 100 inches in the west to less than four inches on Cape Cod, located in the
southeastern part of the state. ld. at 5.
75. Massachusetts uses approximately one billion two hundred million gallons
of fresh water per day, and approximately one billion gallons of this water is from
surface water supplies which are not evenly distributed throughout the state. ld. at
3-5.
The coastal area must depend on ground water supplies for fresh water which
are replenished by coastal precipitation. MASS. DIV. OF WATER RESOURCES,
GROUNDWATER & GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 4 (1976).
76. ld. at 3.
77. See notes 72-74 supra.
78. For an explanation of the hydrologic cycle see MASS. DIV. OF WATER RE
SOURCES, GROUNDWATER & GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS (1976).
79. Justice Kaplan's failure to define the term "surface water" in Tucker ob
scures Massachusetts' new standard governing liability for surface water diversion.
He explains that the reasonable use standard will be used to resolve "quarrels be
tween landowners about surface waters." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3219, 384 N.E.2d at
1201 (emphasis added). It is unclear from Justice Kaplan's opinion whether the rea
sonable use rule will apply to controversies involving only surface waters or to con
- troversies involving subterranean waters as well.
-,
Although Massachusetts surface water rules once applied only to rain or melt
ing snow or ice, the application of the rules has gradually expanded. In Wilson v.
New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 (1871), the Massachusetts court expanded application
of the rules relating to surface waters to cover damages caused by underground
percolating water. Principles of justice and economics were cited as reasons for ex
panding application of the rules. ld. at 266-67. In Kennison v. Beverly, 146 Mass.
467, 16 N.E. 278 (1888), application of the rules was further expanded by holding:
no distinction in respect to legal liability between an injury to land from sur
face water collected in gutters and catch basins which are below the surface
of the adjoining land, and from which the water percolates through the soil,
and an injury from surface water which, overflowing the gutters and catch
basins, runs over the adjoining land, or which is turned directly upon it.
ld. at 469, 16 N.E. at 280. Thus, the application of surface water laws, once gov
erning only interference with water on the surface of land, was expanded to include
interference with subterranean waters.
In Deyo v. Athol Housing Auth., 335 Mass. 459, 140 N.E.2d 393 (1957), the
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the state, a flexible reasonable use rule, which considers all the rel
evant circumstances of each situation, is better adapted for
resolving Massachusetts water problems than the more rigid com
mon enemy rule. 80
The most serious criticism of the reasonable use rule is that it
sets no guidelines to provide landowners with a standard governing
the use of their land. 81 This is precisely the situation in which Jus
tice Kaplan's opinion leaves Massachusetts landowners. He writes:
"[D]etails of the standard will evolve and be determined . . .
through the decisional process. "82 A common but unpersuasive re
tort to the criticism that the reasonable use rule lacks sufficient
guidelines is that "desire for certainty of liability should not and
must not serve as a judicial pardon for the unreasonable conduct
which has been manifested by any landowner in our modem soci
ety."83 Landowners and the lawyers with whom they consult, how
ever, should have some guidelines to follow other than a rather
ambiguous "reasonableness" doctrine in deciding whether to spend
time and money on land improvements. 84
Justice Kaplan suggests referring to cases from several states85
court stated that a landowner is liable for resulting damages if he artificially retains
surface water on his land "so that by its retention it is deflected or backed up upon
another's land . . . . It is immaterial whether injury from water so collected or re
tained results from the flow of surface water or from subsurface percolation." ld. at
462, 140 N.E.2d at 395.
80. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
81. See Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. at 275-76, 341 A.2d at 741, where Justice
Joslin in dissent states that the reasonable use rule, though it may reflect current
feelings about the use and development of land, is not sufficiently clear as stated by
the majority opinion and thereby results in a landowner's not knowing what actions
involving diversion of surface waters are legal and what actions are not legal and,
thus, may result in liability.
C
82. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3220, 384 N.E.2d at 1202.
83. 115 R.l. at 275, 341 A.2d at 741.
84. See generally 115 R.I. at 275-76,341 A.2d at 741 (Joslin, J., dissenting).
85. Justice Kaplan suggests consulting the following cases for determining rea
sonableness in the context of surface water diversion. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3218,
3220,384 N.E.2d at 1201.
Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956), which considers "all
the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the
foreseeability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the pos
sessor acted, and all other relevant matter." ld. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10. Pendergrast
weighs:
the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the conduct to
the defendant .... Determination of the gravity of the harm involves con
sideration of the extent and character of the harm to the plaintiff, the social
value which the law attaches to the type of use which is invaded, the
suitability of the locality for that use, the burden on plaintiff to minimize the
harm, and other relevant considerations arising upon the evidence. Determi
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and to the Restatement of Torts 86 for guidance in determining rea
sonableness. This guidance may, however, be of dubious value
since Justice Kaplan states that the Massachusetts courts are not
committed "to follow in every detail the position elaborated by any
other court or by the Restatement. "87
Arguably, the strength of the judicial system is to define rules on
a case-by-case basis and, thus, gradually to develop a body of law.
This process alleviates the need for numerous modifications and ex
ceptions necessary under a restrictive rule such as the common en
emy rule. But in laying the foundation of a new rule of law, the
law should be sufficiently clear to allow a rational decision about
nation of the utility of the conduct of the defendant involves consideration
of the purpose of the defendant's conduct, the social value which the law at
taches to that purpose, the suitability of the locality for the use defendant
makes of the property, and other relevant considerations arising upon the
evidence.
293 N.C. at 217, 236 S.E.2d at 797. Butler states that liability turns on a determina
tion of the reasonableness of the action and should be detennined upon the consid
eration of all relevant circumstances. 115 R.I. at 272, 341 A.2d at 739. State v. Deetz,
66 Wis. 2d at 16-18,224 N.W.2d at 415-16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 822, at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), § 826, at 3 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972), § 827,
at 36 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), § 828, at 41 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATE
MENT OF TORTS § 833 (1939)).
86. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3219 n.3, 384 N.E.2d at 1201 n.3 (citing RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822-833, at 62-75 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970), §§ 822,
826-828, at 22-47 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), §§ 822, 826, 829, at 1-6 (Tent. Draft No.
18, 1972); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 822-831,833 (1939)).
Section 833 states that "[n]on-trespassory invasions of a person's interest in the
use and enjoyment of land resulting from another's interference with the flow of sur
face water are governed by the rules stated in §§ 822-831." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 833 (1939). Section 822 states that one is subject to liability when "the invasion is
either a) intentional and unreasonable, or b) unintentional and otherwise actionable
under the principles controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for ab
nonnally dangerous conditions or activities." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ~
822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). Section 826 states that an intentional act is deter
mined to be unreasonable if "a) the gravity of the hann outweighs the utility of the
actor's conduct, or b) the hann caused by the conduct is substantial and the financial
burden of compensating for this and other harms does not render infeasible the con
tinuation of the conduct." Id. § 826 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). Section 827 states that
gravity of the hann is to be detennined by weighing "a) the extent of the harm in
volved; b) the character of hann involved; c) the social value which the law attaches
to the type of use or enjoyment invaded; d) the suitability of the particular use or en
joyment invaded to the character of the locality; e) the burden on the person hanned
of avoiding the hann." Id. § 827 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). Section 828 states that
the utility of the conduct is to be detennined by weighing a) the social value the law
attaches to the conduct's purpose; b) the suitability of the conduct to the locality; c)
whether it is impracticable to prevent or avoid the invasion if the act is continued; d)
whether it is impracticable to continue the act if it is required to bear the cost of
compensation. Id. § 828.
87. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3220, 384 N.E.2d at 1202.
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whether an act complies with the law and whether the actor will
be liable for possible damages to others caused by the act. In
deciding whether to improve his land, a landowner should know
whether liability for possible damages to others will ensue and
whether, in computing the cost of an improvement, he must in
clude the cost to others caused by the improvement.
Rather than citing varying and overlapping standards for
determining reasonableness88 which the Massachusetts courts are
not committed to follow,89 Justice Kaplan should have proposed
one test stating the elements that the courts would consider when
determining reasonableness in the context of surface water diver
sion. The test for determining whether an improvement is reason
able,90 and, therefore, whether the improver should not be liable
for damages caused to others by his improvement's diversion of
surface waters, should consider all the relevant circumstances
including such factors as: (1) The value the law attaches to the im
provement compared to the value the law attaches to the right or
action of the injured party with which the improvement inter
feres;91 (2) the benefit to society, the community, and the improver
caused by the improvement compared to the detriment to society,
the community, and the injured party caused by the improve
ment;92 (3) the cost to the improver of avoiding or mitigating the
injury compared to the cost to the injured party of avoiding or
mitigating the injury;93 (4) whether the injury was foreseeable by
88. See notes 85-86 supra.
89. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
90. The test proposed in this paper is meant to be a guide for determining rea
sonableness of surface water diversion. Each element listed may not be appropriate
in every case, and the elements are not meant to be mutually exclusive. The pro
posed test should give both decision makers and landowners a guideline for
determining whether surface water diversion will give rise to liability for resulting
damages. The proposed test contains elements of several other tests. See notes 85-86
supra.
91. See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914),
where the rights of the railroad, considered as a public improvement, are compared
to an individual's private property rights.
92. See Butler v. Bruno,,l15 R.I. at 274,341 A.2d at 741, for a discussion of the
need to consider the true cost to the community of an improvement in order to
achieve an equitable allocation of the costs of land improvement. See also Enderson
v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 168-70, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289-90 (1948), which in de
termining liability for surface water diversion considers whether the benefit to the
improved land outweighs the harm resulting to others.
93. See Keys v. Romlev, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 537, 64 Cal. Rptr.
396, 409 (1966), which is determining liability for surface water diversion considers
both the duty of an improving landowner to take reasonable care to avoid injury to
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the improver and, if the injury were foreseeable, whether the im
prover knew or should have known of feasible alternate methods of
improvement that would ,have avoided or mitigated the injury;94
and (5) whether imposing liability on either the improver or the in
jured party would preclude the continuance of an activity that is
desired by society or by the community.95
The applicability of this test can be examined by using' Tucker
as the hypothetical. If this test were applied to Tucker, it would be
necessary to determine exactly what improvement Badoian made to
his land, and then the first and second elements of the test could
be applied. If Badoian's improvement consisted of building a road
to provide better access to a recreational area to be used solely by
him, the first and second elements of the test would weigh toward
holding him liable.
Under the third element of the test, it is necessary to deter
mine which party could avoid or mitigate the injury more inex
pensively. If Badoian could have avoided all injury to the Tuckers
by digging a drainage ditch costing $50, but the Tuckers could
have avoided injury only by spending several thousand dollars to
rebank their property, the third element of the test would weigh
toward holding Badoian liable.
Under the fourth element of the test, it would be necessary to
determine whether the Tuckers' injury was foreseeable to Badoian.
If it were foreseeable, it would be necessary to determine whether
Badoian knew or should have known of feasible alternate methods
of improvement that would have avoided or mitigated the injury. If
Badoian knew that his improvement would result in substantial in
jury to the Tuckers, and if he knew that the injury could have
been avoided by digging a ditch costing only $50, the fourth ele
ment would weigh toward holding him liable.
Under the fifth element of the test, it is necessary to examine
the nature of the defendant's improvement. If the improvement is
one that is desired by society or by the community and if holding
others and the duty of a person threatened with injury to his property by the flow of
surface waters to take reasonable precautions to avoid or reduce the injury.
94. See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 168, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1948)
(in detennining liability for surface water diversion considers whether reasonable
care has been taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land receiving the water);
Annstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10 (in detennining liability
for the diversion of surface water considers the foreseeability of the hann caused).
95. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying (discussion of the judiciary's pro
motion of the nineteenth century social goal of furthering land development by not
imposing liability for surface water diversion).
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Badoian liable would preclude the desired improvement, this ele
ment would weigh toward not holding him liable. If Badoian's im
provement consisted of building a road to provide better access to
a recreational area to be used solely by him, and imposing liability
on him would preclude the building of the road by making the pro
ject financially infeasible, it is unlikely that society or the commu
nity would have sufficient interest in Badoian's improvement to
free him from liability. In such a case, the fifth element of the test
would weigh toward holding Badoian liable. Each relevant element
of the test should be examined and weighed against the other ele
ments to determine liability.
The foreseeability portion of the test should be applied more
or less stringently depending upon the circumstances. For exam
ple, if the improvement is the building of a nuclear plant, the
foreseeability portion of the test should be applied more strin
gently. The large scale nature of such a project and the clear
knowledge of far-reaching effects justify imposing the burden of
investigating the possibility of damages to others and the feasibility
of alternate methods of improvement. If the improvement is one
that affects only neighboring landowners, however, the fore
seeability portion of the test should be applied less stringently. A
less stringent application of this portion of the test prevents the
need for costly research to determine both the possibility of dam
ages which might result from the improvement and the feasibility
of alternate methods of improving the land. This is a task that few
landowners would pursue before making an improvement and a
task that few landowners could afford if the injured party brought
suit. The rationale for not imposing this task on a small landowner
whose improvement affects only his neighbor is that the effects of
the improvement are not sufficiently far-reaching to justify the cost
necessary for compliance with such a burden. Thus, whether an
improver "knew or should have known of feasible alternate meth
ods of improvement that would have avoided or mitigated the in
jUry" depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
The suggested test retains the flexibility necessary for a rule to
be applied with equitable results in a state with diverse water
problems. 96 It allows a landowner to make a rational, cost-based
decision of whether to improve his land by allowing him to know
96. See notes 71-80 supra and accompanying text (discussiori of Massachusetts'
water problems).
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whether his improvement will result in any liability for subsequent
damages caused by surface water diversion and, therefore, whether
he should consider potential liability costs in computing the total
cost of the improvement. This test informs the landowner of the
factors that will be used in determining liability and it precludes
the uncertainty of liability that must follow Justice Kaplan's opin
ion97 which stated varying and overlapping standards that the
courts are not committed -to follow. 98
IV.

CONCLUSION

Massachusetts laws governing surface water controversies have
undergone cOntinual change. In order to promote land develop
ment during the nineteenth century, Massachusetts adopted the
common enemy rule for resolving these controversies. This rule al
lows a landowner to improve his land and thereby alter the flow of
surface water to his neighbor's detriment without incurring liability
for his neighbor's damages. As the overwhelming importance as
cribed to land development diminished, Massachusetts reflected
this change in social policy by modifying and making exceptions to
the common enemy rule. The modifications and exceptions gradu
ally became so numerous that confusion and uncertainty resulted.
In Tucker, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wisely de
cided to abandon its modified form of the common enemy rule and
to adopt the flexible reasonable use rule for future controversies.
By its adoption of the reasonable use rule in Tucker,
Massachusetts has taken a great step toward implementing the cur
rent social policy of just allocation of development costs. The rule
is also well suited in its flexibility for use in a state with diverse
water problems. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, how
ever, failed to provide clear guidelines for determining what consti
tutes a reasonable use of land in the context of surface water diver
sion.
Although surface water laws are extremely important due to
their effect on the water cycle, courts can refer to only a narrow
97. See notes 81 & 84 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the lack of
guidelines provided by the reasonable use standard adopted by Rhode Island in But
ler v. Bruno, 115 R.l. at 264, 341 A.2d at 735).
98. See notes 85-86 supra (tests suggested as gUidance in determining reason
ableness of surface water diversion in Massachusetts). See also note 87 supra and ac
companying text (Massachusetts' failure to commit itself to following the suggested
tests is discussed).
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range of cases. Many years must necessarily elapse before the
courts rule on a sufficient number of cases to evolve a clear mean
ing of "reasonableness" in the context of surface water diversion.
Rather than waiting many years, the Massachusetts court should
adopt the test for determining reasonableness that is proposed in
this note. The proposed test is sufficiently flexible to be equitably
applied where there are diverse water problems, and it is suffi
ciently clear in its guidelines to enable a landowner to make a ra
tional, cost-based decision of whether to improve his land. The un
certainty of liability will be obviated. The landowner, therefore,
will be apprised of the factors used in determining liability and
could direct his actions and decisions accordingly.
Although the Massachusetts court deserves praise both for
adopting a rule well suited in its flexibility for use and for fulfilling
its role as an implementer of changing social policy, it should soon
delineate clear guidelines for determining what constitutes a rea
sonable use of land in the context of surface water diversion.
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